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a bridge too far: the fall of the fifth
wto ministerial conference in cancún
and the future of trade constitution
Sungjoon Cho*
‘Poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere’.**
abstract
This article is intended to contribute to the process of diagnosis and
prescription in response to the fiasco of the Fifth WTO Ministerial
Conference in Cancún, Mexico, in September 2003. The article sketches
previous WTO Ministerial Conferences in an attempt to glimpse the root of
the problems that eventually caused the collapse of the Cancún Conference.
It then focuses on the main developments in Cancún and offers a ‘post-
mortem’, not in an attempt to place blame but to better understand what
went wrong. It observes that North–South tension is likely to continue for the
time being while rich countries, especially the US, will lean toward
bilateralism and regionalism. Yet, it also suggests that with a combination
of hard work by Member countries, political support from NGOs and
businesses, and the Secretariat’s constructive role, the Doha Round can and
should be saved. The article concludes that the global trading community is
now embracing another ‘constitutional moment’ which parallels the creation
of the GATT 1947 and the WTO.
introduction
The fanfare of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico, in
September 2003 quickly developed into an inglorious din of cross-criticism
and finger-pointing. The Cancún Conference was expected to deliver a solid,
workable framework to fulfil the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and to
herald a positive signal to the global trading community. Despite hopes and
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ambition, the Cancún Conference collapsed, failing to address developed
countries’ prevailing protectionism in the sectors of agriculture and textiles,
on which many developing countries depend for their subsistence. The
collapse has begun to arouse doubts and skepticism about the effectiveness of
the multilateral trading system.
Although the failure of the Cancún Conference is a source of disappoint-
ment and even frustration, the global trading community cannot afford any
inaction or apathy at a time when millions on earth are still suffering from
hunger and poverty, and major economies across the globe are in recession.
WTO Members have to break through the current negotiation deadlock and
move on with further consultation, negotiation, and deliberation. In doing so,
they should first ruminate on what went wrong in Cancún and contemplate
how they can overcome those pitfalls to make meaningful progress. Without
such a soul-searching diagnosis, no workable prescription can emerge. This
paper seeks to make a contribution to this process of diagnosis and
prescription.
The paper is premised on the concept of a ‘trade constitution’, which
represents a ‘very delicate mix of economic and governmental policies,
political constraints, and above all an intricate set of constraints imposed by a
variety of rules or legal norms in a particular institutional setting’.1 No other
concept can do a better job in capturing and explaining the recent phenomena
that have occurred in Cancún. We have witnessed how domestic policies have
influenced and constrained the operation of the WTO system. At the same
time, however, the WTO norm must constrain those Member countries’
policies in order to achieve the WTO’s institutional goal or telos. In this
context, ‘trade constitution’ is a useful conceptual tool for analyzing and
evaluating current developments in the global trading system.
Part I sketches previous WTO Ministerial Conferences in an attempt to
glimpse the roots of the problems that eventually caused the collapse of the
Cancún Conference. Part II focuses on the main developments in Cancún
and carries out a ‘post-mortem’,2 not in an attempt to place blame but to
better understand what went wrong. Part III is devoted to prospects and
suggestions. It observes that North–South tension is likely to continue for the
1 John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 2nd
edn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) 339; John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization:
Constitution and Jurisprudence 101–04 (London: Royal Institution of International Affairs 1998); John
H. Jackson, ‘Reflections on International Economic Law’, 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. (1996) 17, 25–
28; John H. Jackson, ‘Perspectives on Regionalism in Trade Relations’, 27 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus.
(1996) 873. See also Antonio F. Perez, ‘WTO and U.N. Law: Institutional Comity in National
Security’, 23 Yale J. Int’l L. (1998) 301, 316–24 (discussing Professor Jackson’s constitutional
premise of international trade law).
2 Cf. Sylvia Ostry, ‘Making Sense of It All: A Post-Mortem on the Meaning of Seattle’, in Roger B.
Porter and Pierre Sauvé (eds), Seattle, the WTO, and the Future of the Multilateral Trading System
(Harvard, CT: Center for Busines and Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government 2000)
81.
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time being while rich countries, especially the US, will lean toward
bilateralism and regionalism. Yet, it also suggests that with a combination
of hard work by Member countries, political support from NGOs and
businesses, and the Secretariat’s constructive role, the Doha Round can and
should be saved. The paper concludes that the global trading community is
now embracing another ‘constitutional moment’, which parallels the creation
of the GATT 1947 and the WTO.
i. the road to cancún: pre-cancÚn ministerial conferences
A. Ambitious early years: Singapore (December 1996) and Geneva (May
1998)
The WTO Charter, namely the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, stipulates in Article IV:1 that ‘There shall be a Ministerial
Conference composed of representatives of all the Members, which shall meet
at least once every two years’.3 Under this mandate, the first Ministerial
Meeting was held in Singapore from 9 to 13 December 1996 to evaluate the
implementation of Members’ commitments under the WTO rules and to
review the ongoing negotiations.4
Numerous issues, ranging from labor standards to the challenges of least-
developed countries (LDCs), were submitted and discussed, reflecting the
fact that this was the very first WTO Ministerial Meeting since the historic
launch of the WTO system. Although debates and discussions regarding most
issues were compiled into rather fluid language in the final Ministerial
Declaration, certain Members, including both developed and developing
countries, successfully concluded a significant pact among themselves
concerning freer trade in ‘information technology products’. The ‘Ministerial
Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products’ requires each
participating Member to ‘bind and eliminate’ tariffs and other charges with
respect to a comprehensive range of information technology products, such as
computers and their various parts and components.5
Despite this propitious achievement, there were also omens of the future
fiasco in Cancún. A rift between developed and developing countries became
apparent, centering on traditional North–South issues such as core labor
standards, investment, and competition. As for core labor standards,
developing countries succeeded in de-linking this issue from trade by
3 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, art. IV, para 1
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round [hereinafter
Results of the Uruguay Round], 6, 6–18; 33 I.L.M. (1994) 1140, 1144–1153.
4 WTO, The Singapore Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 13 December 1996, WT/MIN(96)/DEC,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm [hereinafter the Singapore
Ministerial Declaration].
5 WTO, Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products, Singapore, 13
December 1996, WT/MIN(96)/16, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/inftec_e/itadec_e.htm.
The Future of Trade Constitution 221
stipulating that the International Labor Organization (ILO) is the competent
body to handle this issue and that the use of labor standards for protectionist
purposes should be rejected.6 In contrast, developed countries managed to
push onto the WTO agenda hitherto controversial issues, such as investment
and competition, which were later dubbed the ‘Singapore issues’.7 Members
agreed to establish ‘working groups’ to examine and study the relationship
between trade and these issues.8
The Singapore Ministerial Declaration explicitly addressed potential
problems that eventually contributed to the fall of the Cancún Conference
several years later. It highlighted development concerns of the LDCs9 and
warned against their ‘marginalization’ from the global trading system.10 It also
urged ‘full and faithful’ implementation of the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing (ATC), particularly in a way that would help the world’s poorest
countries, including ‘cotton-exporting’ Members.11 Yet, rich countries have
since failed to respond to this appeal from the LDCs, who submitted another
desperate appeal in the form of the ‘Cotton Initiative’ in Cancún.
The second WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Geneva in May 1998
when East Asian countries still suffered from the dire aftermath of the
financial crisis. This Ministerial Conference was supposedly more ceremonial
than negotiational as 1998 was the 50th anniversary of the creation of the
modern global trading system embodied by the GATT. However, two
developments at this Conference merit attention. First, Ministers declared
that protection is not the right approach to tackling the financial crisis.12
Second, Ministers adopted the ‘Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce’
in which they established a ‘comprehensive work program’ to examine all
trade-related aspects of electronic commerce and pledged their continuous
practice of exempting tariffs on electronic transmissions.13
B. The Seattle debacle (December 1999)
Despite seemingly propitious initiatives in the early years, developing
countries became increasingly disappointed at the lack of developed
6 This point was later reaffirmed in the Doha Ministerial Declaration. WTO, The Doha Ministerial
Conference, adopted on November 14, 2001, WT/MIN(01)/1, para 8, http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm [hereinafter the Doha Ministerial Declaration].
7 They connote four issues: trade facilitation, transparency in government procurement, investment,
and competition. Singapore Ministerial Declaration, above n 4, paras 20–23.
8 Id.
9 Id, para 14.
10 Id, para 5.
11 Id, para 15.
12 WTO, The Geneva Ministerial Declaration, adopted 20 May 1998, WT/MIN(98)/DEC/1, para 3,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min98_e/mindec_e.htm.
13 WTO, Declaration on Global Economic Commerce, adopted on 20 May 1998, WT/MIN(98)/DEC/
2, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min98_e/ecom_e.htm.
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countries’ faithful implementation of what they had promised in the Uruguay
Round. Developed countries continued to maintain high trade barriers on
imports of those primary, labor-intensive goods, such as agricultural products
and textiles on which developing countries hold a comparative advantage.
This ‘development deficit’14 costs poor countries over $100 billion a year,
which is twice the total amount of foreign aid from North to South.15
Developing countries complained of the ‘uneven distribution’16 of benefits
among Members and criticized the failure to realize the WTO’s foremost telos,
namely ‘sustainable development’.17
Developing countries’ disappointment had already turned to frustration
when the Seattle Ministerial Meeting opened. This frustration could not be
redressed by developed countries due to their lack of political will or political
capital and only deepened a pre-existing rift between North and South, which
is said to be the main culprit for the collapse of the Seattle Conference.18
Admittedly, the Seattle debacle may also be ascribed to other logistical
factors besides the North–South tension. First, the Conference itself was ill-
prepared. Members had already spent a great deal of energy in debating who
should succeed Renato Ruggiero as the next WTO Director-General and
negotiation committees were set up only weeks before the Conference.19
Hence, there was no workable text for negotiation to start with.20 Second, in
an astonishing political gesture, the then-US President Bill Clinton expressly
14 Celso L.N. Amorim, ‘The WTO from the Perspective of a Developing Country’, 24 Fordham Int’l
L.J. (2000) 95, 96–99 (criticizing ‘development deficit’ in the WTO in the areas of agriculture and
textiles).
15 Globalization, Growth, and Poverty: Building an Inclusive World Economy 9, 53, A World Bank Policy
Research Report (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002) [hereinafter Globalization, Growth, and
Poverty].
16 Cf. WTO, WTO News: Speeches – DG Mike Moore (23 September 1999), Africa and the Multilateral
Trading System: Challenges and Opportunities, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/
spmm07_e.htm. (‘There must be something in the pie for everyone. Not pie in the sky when we
die, but pie on the table’.).
17 WTO Agreement, above n 3, preamble.
18 ‘The Seattle WTO ministerial meeting failed to launch a new round, not because of the protests in
the streets, but because the major trading powers lacked the political will to accommodate the
interests of developing countries. . . . In order for developing countries to have confidence in a new
round, rich countries must deliver on commitments made in the past, such as accelerating the
agricultural trade negotiations and phasing out quotas on textiles and clothing’. Globalization,
Growth, and Poverty, above n 15, at 60 (quoting the recent report of the UN High-Level Panel on
Financing for Development). Cf. Diana Tussie and Miguel F. Lengyel, ‘Developing Countries:
Turning Participation into Influence’, in Bernard Hoekman et al. (eds), Development, Trade, and the
WTO: A Handbook (2002) 485, 490 (observing that ‘after the significant concessions made in the
Uruguay Round, developing countries felt entitled to be included in the green-room process’).
19 Supachai Panitchpakdi, ‘Keynote Address: The Evolving Multilateral Trading System in the New
Millennium’, 33 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 419, 427–28.
20 Id.
The Future of Trade Constitution 223
sympathized with demonstrators in the streets and vowed that he would push
for linking labor standards to trade via sanctions.21 This was a cold shower to
most developing countries, causing their frustration to turn to anger. Perhaps
President Clinton did not realize that this issue was a fait accompli in the
Singapore Ministerial Conference. Some of the protesters with whom he
sympathized were, themselves, a substantial source of disruption. At the
Seattle Conference, some Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) took
steps to torpedo the proceedings, creating a great deal of chaos. Sadly, in
doing so they also blocked the legitimate voices of many peaceful NGOs.
Interestingly, this milieu also gave rise to such odd anti-WTO alliances as the
‘Turtle-Teamster Partnership’.22
Beyond these problems, the general administration of the conference was
not very methodical. Sylvia Ostry recollects that many delegates shared the
view that this was one of the most poorly run international meetings that they
had attended.23 Worse, the conference chair, the then-United States Trade
Representative (USTR) Charlene Barshefsky, assumed the head of the US
delegation, which, to many ministers, called into question the fairness of the
conference.24
C. A new hope in Doha (November 2001)
The fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, held in Doha, Qatar, in 2001, was
conducted under tense circumstances. The Seattle debacle still haunted the
WTO. Furthermore, the conference was mustered only two months after the
September 11 terrorist attacks. Ironically, this tough atmosphere pressured
delegates from both developed and developing countries to strike a deal and
herald a propitious signal to the global trading community, which desperately
sought a breakthrough in the face of the global recession and post-traumatic
symptoms of the September 11 attacks.
The Doha agenda centered on development issues, giving rise to terms such
as ‘Doha Development Agenda (DDA)’ and ‘Development Round’. Even
before the Doha Conference, a wide international consensus was formed on
the priority of development in any trade deals. The UN Secretary-General,
the World Bank President, and the IMF Managing Director all voiced an
urgent need to address global poverty and an essential role of trade for this
21 Ostry, above n 2, at 81.
22 Id, at 90. See also Robert Howse, ‘Managing the Interface between International Trade Law and the
Regulatory State: What Lessons Should (and Should Not) Be Drawn from the Jurisprudence of the
United States Dormant Commerce Clause’, in Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis (eds),
Regulatory Barriers and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in World Trade Law (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 2000) 147 (citing David Vogel’s notion of ‘Baptist-bootlegger alliances’).
23 Ostry, above n 2, at 82–83.
24 Id, at 83.
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objective.25 Reflecting such serious consideration in the international
community, the Doha Ministerial Conference produced clear negotiation
objectives, transitional deadlines and detailed ‘work programs’ on the DDA,
even highlighting ‘well targeted, substantially financed technical assistance
and capacity-building programs’.26
In an ambitious move, the Doha Ministerial Declaration nailed down a final
deadline of 1 January 2005, as the date for completing the Doha Round.
Apart from the main Ministerial Declaration, the Doha Conference
succeeded in issuing two important development-related legal documents:
‘Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health’,27 which endorses
Members to grant compulsory licenses in the face of public health crises, and
‘Decision of 14 November 2001 on Implementation’, which spells out
implementation-related issues and concerns.28 At the same time, however,
the Ministerial Declaration also left ground for future negotiation of the
Singapore issues.29
ii. the main field: cancun ministerial conference
(september 2003)
A. Background
In January 2002, Member countries assembled for the first meeting of the
Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) to begin working on the Doha
Agenda.30 The TNC established seven negotiating bodies for agriculture,
services, non-agricultural market access, rules, trade and environment, a
multilateral register for geographical indicators for wines and spirits, and
reform of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).31 Subsequently,
25 Development: Annan Calls for ‘Development Round’ of Trade Talks, UN Wire, 19 September 2000,
http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20000919/10846_story.asp. World Bank President James Wolfen-
sohn also warned that ‘global poverty and the resulting social unrest threatens to destabilize
developed countries’ and that ‘it is in their interest to bring about poverty alleviation in the
developing world because we are one world and, unless we get stability and growth in the developing
world, we are not going to have a peaceful world’. IMF/World Bank: Wolfensohn Promotes Equitable
Growth, UN Wire, 22 September 2000, http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20000922/10924_story.-
asp. Cf. Frederick M. Abbott, ‘The Enduring Enigma of TRIPS: A Challenge for the World
Economic System’, 1 JIEL (1998) 497 (arguing that developed countries’ emphasis on the static
protection of intellectual property rights is misplaced and that such emphasis on maintaining
technological advantage is a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ approach incompatible with an integrating world
economy).
26 The Doha Ministerial Declaration, above n 6, para 2. See also id, paras 38–41.
27 WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted on 20 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/2, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm.
28 WTO, Decision of 14 December 2001, WT/MIN(01)/17, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_implementation_e.htm.
29 The Doha Ministerial Declaration, above n 6, paras 20–27.
30 WTO, The Doha Developing Agenda: Doha Launches Negotiations, TNC Oversees Them, www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/brief_e/brief02_e.htm.
31 Id.
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most negotiations were conducted in a ‘special session’ of each corresponding
committee or council.32 This initial grandiose march for a new Round soon
became a slow and tedious process. Although Members reached a certain
consensus on the general framework of the Doha Round, they faced
difficulties in implementing them, mainly because most agendas were
politically sensitive, requiring a good deal of concession and contribution,
in particular from the developed countries. The devil was in the details.
Although the Doha Declaration is full of verbal commitments and plans for
capacity building, it is silent about how to fund the ambitious technical
assistance programs. Furthermore, its legal nature as a ‘work program’ is
vague. One might reasonably speculate that this document would not be
enforceable through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism since the DSU
applies only to ‘covered agreements’.33 Therefore, the success of all capacity
building, which is critical to developing countries to integrate their fragile
economies into the global trade stream, is at the mercy of a handful of wealthy
Member countries, which have not been generous in this regard in the past.
More recently, while disappointing trade figures urge progress in trade
negotiations,34 a new US farm bill introducing $180 billion in subsidies over
the next decade and the EU’s failure to reform its Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) have made a ‘mockery of the idea that the Doha round was to
be a development round’.35 Many world leaders, including the heads of
international organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, and the OECD,
once again urged developed countries to eliminate their protection against
developing countries’ market access in agriculture and textiles.36 The Cancún
Ministerial Conference was held against this rather depressing background.
The only good news came just before the opening of the conference.
Developed countries, in particular the US, agreed on certain legal changes
that enabled certain developing countries, which cannot manufacture
essential medicines themselves, to import cheaper generics produced under
compulsory licensing in other countries.37 Ironically, this concession from
rich countries cost them their political capital, which militated against a
possible compromise in Cancún.
32 Id.
33 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 of the
WTO Agreement, above n 3, art. 1, para 1.
34 TRADE: WTO Says Slowdown Underscores Need for Progress on Doha, UN Wire, 11 October 2002,
http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20021011/29596_story.asp.
35 ‘World Trade: Coming Unstuck’, The Economist (2 November 2002), at 14; ‘The Zoellick Plan:
Trading Insults’, The Economist (30 November 2002), at 67.
36 See e.g., Declaration by the Heads of the IMF, OECD and World Bank, http://www.oecd.org/
document/9/0,2340,en_2649_201185_11813577_1_1_1_1,00.html.
37 WTO TRIPs Council, Decision of 30 August 2003: Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health, WT/L/540, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm.
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B. The negotiation: main developments
1. Modus operandi: five subjects and five facilitators
The conference chair, Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez,
invited five ministers to act as ‘facilitators’. Their role was similar to ‘friends of
the chair’ at the Doha Ministerial Meeting,38 where they functioned as de facto
‘deputies’ to the chair who moderated and coordinated actual negotiations
among individual groups and delegations. Based on reports by facilitators, the
chair launched informal meetings with heads of delegations.39
These five facilitators corresponded with five negotiation agendas:
‘agriculture’ (George Yeo Yong-Bon, Singapore’s Trade and Industry
Minister); ‘non-agricultural market access’ (NAMA) (Henry Tang Ying-
yen, Hong Kong China’s Financial Secretary); ‘development’ (Mukhisa
Kituyi, Kenya’s Trade and Industry Minister); ‘Singapore issues’ (Pierre
Pettigrew, Canada’s International Trade Minister); and ‘other issues’
(Clement Rohee, Guyana’s Foreign Trade and International Cooperation
Minister).40
2. Agriculture: the real hardcore
Agriculture, in particular the issue of farm subsidies, was a defining agenda of
the Cancún Conference. All eyes were fixed upon these negotiations.
Although the Doha Declaration committed Member countries, in particular
developed countries, to phasing out ‘all forms of export subsidies’ and
substantially reducing ‘trade-distorting domestic support’,41 actual negotia-
tions since that time have done little more than reveal a diametrical difference
in positions between North and South. Member countries failed to agree even
on ‘modalities’ of the negotiations, a task that was to be completed by the
deadline of 31 March 2003.42
As the Cancún Conference drew on, the US and the EU took initiative and
issued a joint position on the agriculture negotiations. Although this joint
position, announced on 13 August 2003,43 did break the inertia of the long
hibernating agricultural negotiations, it was weak and watered down relative
to previous proposals discussed in Geneva.44
38 WTO, Summary of 10 September, 2003, Day 1: Conference kicks off with ‘facilitators’ named and
cotton debated, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_10sept_e.htm [here-
inafter WTO, Day 1].
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 The Doha Ministerial Declaration, above n 6, para 13.
42 Id, para 14.
43 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Statement, Regarding the US–EU Framework
for WTO Agricultural Negotiations, 13 August 2003, www.usda.gov/news/releases/2003/08/
0287.htm.
44 Bridges Daily Update on the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, Issue 1, Cancun Ministerial: Setting the
Stage, 10 September 2003, http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/wto_daily/ben030910.htm
[hereinafter Bridges, Issue 1].
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First of all, no detailed ‘timeframes or figures to cut’ existed.45 In substance,
the EU and the US limited the elimination of export subsidies (amber box)46
to ‘products of particular interest to developing countries’.47 In the reduction
of other forms of trade-distorting domestic support (blue box), they created a
new category of ‘less trade-distorting domestic support’ which would have no
production limit and could possibly open the door to legalizing the 2002 US
Farm Bill.48 In terms of trade-neutral domestic support (green box), they
surprisingly failed to deliver any provisions.49 This joint paper was severely
criticized by developing countries led by Brazil, India, and China, who also
presented their own proposal.50
Originally, the US–EU joint paper did provide a base text for the agriculture
negotiations.51 However, the initial dissenters, Brazil, India, and China,
eventually succeeded in persuading other developing countries to form a
coalition dubbed ‘G-21’, despite the fact that some members of the G-21
faced pressure from the US and the EU not to join.52 Their proposal called
for the elimination of export subsidies on all products. Ultimately, the initial
joint US–EU text was withdrawn by Conference Chair Derbez.53
Notably, the US–EU coalition in agriculture seemed to be a bit awkward
considering their traditionally contrasting positions on this subject. The US,
having a strong export interest in agriculture, took an offensive position in the
agricultural negotiation. Its technology-driven, extensive farming industry
exports a quarter of its total production, which amounted to $57 billion
during the 2002 fiscal year.54 Highlighting an overriding objective in its
agricultural trade talks to ‘gain greater market access’, USDA Secretary Ann
45 Id.
46 Regarding three different modalities of agricultural subsidies (amber, blue, and green box), see
generally WTO, Agricultural Negotiations, Background Fact Sheet, Domestic Support in Agriculture: The
Boxes, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.htm.
47 ‘Agriculture: Real Negotiations Start as EC, US Table Joint Modalities Text’, Bridges Weekly Trade
News Digest, Vol. 7, No. 28, 21 August 2003, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/03-08-21/index.htm.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Developing Countries Present Farm-Trade Plan to WTO, UN Wire, 21 August 2003, http://
www.unwire.org/UNWire/20030821/449_7715.asp.
51 Bridges, Issue 1, above n 38.
52 Rolf Kuntz, G-21 consegul nivelar campo para ojogo agrı́cola, 11 September 2003, www.estado.es-
tadao.com.br; Protests Dies at WTO Talks; Draft Agriculture Plan Withdrawn, UN Wire, 11 September
2003, http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20030911/449_8349.asp [hereinafter UN Wire, 11 Septem-
ber]; Bridges Daily Update on the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, Issue 2, ‘Cotton – ‘‘The TRIPs
and Health’’ of Cancun?’, 11 September 2003, http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/wto_daily/
ben030911.htm [hereinafter Bridges, Issue 2].
53 UN Wire, 11 September above n 52.
54 United States Department of Agriculture, News Release (No. 0230.01), Historic Opportunity for U.S.
Farmers as New Agenda for Trade Negotiations Are Launched in Qatar, 14 November 2001,
www.usda.gov/news/releases/2001/11/0230.htm.
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Veneman stated that ‘Expanding global markets for our farmers is vital to the
long-term prosperity of our highly productive agriculture and food sector’.55
Therefore, the US could maintain a relatively flexible position, willing to cut
farm subsidies if such a reduction corresponded to an increase in market
access to US trading partners, including the EU.56
In contrast, the EU’s position, though still suffering an internal
cacophony,57 was much more defensive as a result of its controversial
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). While the EU joined the US in
demanding increased market access to developing countries, it insisted more
strongly on the expansion of geographical indications and direct payment for
high environmental protection to make up the loss of its export market.58 One
might reasonably suspect that the EU’s insistence on the expansion of
geographical indications in areas other than wine and spirits, for instance
certain ham and cheese, was intended to collect bargaining chips for future
agriculture negotiations, considering that very few Member countries are
enthusiastic about this issue. In fact, Canada’s Trade Minister Pierre
Pettigrew warned against this proposal, describing it as ‘open[ing] a
Pandora’s box that will take decades to close’.59
There are two possible explanations for this implausible coalition between
the US and the EU. First, President Bush’s bold Farm Bill issued in 2002,
which would provide farm subsidies amounting to $180 billion over the next
decade, forced the US to jump on the EU’s protectionist bandwagon. Second,
the two economic superpowers may have been attempting to pre-empt the
negotiations by submitting a joint text that would have formed the basis of the
subsequent negotiations in Cancún. Of course, this attempt proved to be
futile in the face of the developing countries’ coalition, i.e., the G-21.
Unfortunately, days of intense negotiations only reaffirmed diverging
stances among Member countries on the issue of agriculture. While the EU
objected to the capping of trade-distorting domestic support (blue box) and
agreed to eliminate export subsidies (amber box) only on a selective basis, the
G-21 argued that such a proposal was deficient and unacceptable.60 Perhaps
only a few days of negotiations in Cancún were simply not enough to resolve
such a difficult issue, particularly with a subject so closely linked to the
‘Singapore issues’.
55 Id.
56 Bridges, Issue 2, above n 52.
57 Bridges, Issue 1, above n 44.
58 Bridges, Issue 2, above n 52.
59 Id.
60 Bridges Daily Update on the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, Issue 5, ‘At the Eleventh Hour,
Divergence All Over Again’, 14 September 2003, http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/wto_daily/
ben030914.htm [hereinafter Bridges, Issue 5].
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3. The cotton proposal
Four cotton-producing countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali)
located in West and Central Africa submitted a desperate proposal, which was
rather a plea, demanding that rich countries eliminate their subsidies to
cotton farmers and that due compensation be paid to these four countries for
economic damages resulting from these subsidies.61 This proposal was in fact
aimed at the world’s largest cotton subsidizer, the US. Markedly, the proposal
demonstrated a textbook example of the pernicious effects of a subsidy. These
countries retain a comparative advantage on cotton production thanks to their
cheap labor and natural endowments. They are also highly dependent on the
export of cotton, which amounts to 80 percent of their export earnings.62
However, they still cannot compete in the market with heavily subsidized and
thus artificially low-priced cotton from rich countries. Their proposal was so
appealing that WTO Director-General Supachai invited himself to chair the
negotiation of the proposal. He pointed out that these countries were not
asking for any special favors, but merely for all nations to play by the rules.63
Despite broad support of the proposal from both developed and developing
countries, the US issued a de facto rejection of the proposal as it argued that
subsidies are not the sole culprit for market distortions. The US listed other
factors, such as ‘good harvests’, as contributory to falling cotton prices.64 It
also suggested that these countries should ‘diversify’ their production away
from cotton to textiles so that they are subject to preferential market access to
the US under its ‘African Growth and Opportunity Act’.65 The four African
countries that submitted the proposal, and their supporters, were deeply
frustrated by the US refusal to eliminate subsidies, even to the world’s poorest
countries.66 One African cotton producer reportedly said,
‘We are used to hardship, disease and famine. Now the WTO is against us as
well. I think that this will stay in history . . . ’67
4. Singapore issues: the conference-buster
Singapore issues, in particular investment and competition, were mirror
images of agriculture in Cancún. As in agriculture, North and South were
split diametrically over these matters. While developed countries generally
advocated that the WTO should reflect the realities of the ever-growing
61 Bridges Daily Update on the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, Issue 3, ‘Will Chair’s AG Text Warm
Up Frozen Talks?’, 12 September 2003, http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/wto_daily/
ben030912.htm [hereinafter Bridges, Issue 3].
62 Bridges, Issue 2, above n 52.
63 WTO, Day 1, above n 38.
64 Id.
65 Bridges, Issue 2, above n 52.
66 Bridges, Issue 5, above n 60.
67 Id.
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relevance of these issues to trade, developing countries generally feared that
this linkage might undermine their comparative advantage or function as
disguised discrimination, i.e., create new trade barriers against developing
countries’ exports in the name of investment and competition. This tension,
hearkening back to the Singapore Ministerial Conference, was left unresolved
in the Doha Ministerial Conference, which only rendered vague suggestions
regarding future negotiations on these issues. That is, while negotiations
would take place in Cancún,68 their ‘modalities’ would be decided by an
‘explicit consensus’ of Member countries.69
Not surprisingly, the tension continued in Cancún. Many developed
countries, including the EU as a main proponent, characterized the Singapore
issues as being just as ‘integral’ to the Doha Round as agriculture, and that
negotiations on these issues should be launched immediately considering the
demands for enhanced rules by international business.70 In contrast, many
developing countries, including China, India, Malaysia, and Nigeria, argued
that these issues should be sent back to Geneva for further study and
clarification in the absence of ‘explicit consensus’ among Member countries
and that they should be de-coupled from other issues on the table.71 As a
third approach, some developing countries suggested that each Singapore
issue should be considered ‘on its own merits’ and supported negotiations on
less controversial issues, i.e., trade facilitation and transparency in govern-
ment procurement.72
Nonetheless, Pierre Pettigrew, the facilitator for negotiations of Singapore
issues, noted that he encountered plausible suggestions for compromise, such
as breaking the whole into four individual issues and negotiating each at a
different pace, explicitly exempting some issues from the WTO dispute
settlement procedure, and creating plurilateral agreements on an issue-by-
issue basis.73
5. Closing moments
By the eve of the last day of the conference, Members had still not narrowed
their differences, especially in the areas of farm subsidies and the Singapore
issues. After discovering that ‘speech after speech’ in a meeting with the heads
of the delegations had been devoted to the Singapore issues, Conference
Chair Derbez decided to focus on these issues during the last set of
68 The Doha Ministerial Declaration, above n 6, paras 20, 23.
69 Id.
70 WTO, Summary of 11 September, 2003, Day 2, Cambodia and Nepal membership sealed as
ministers start negotiations, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_11sep-
t_e.htm [hereafter WTO, Day 2]; Bridges, Issue 1, above n 44; Bridges, Issue 3, above n 61.
71 WTO, Day 2, above n 70; Bridges, Issue 1, above n 44; Bridges, Issue 3, above n 61.
72 WTO, Day 2, above n 70.
73 Bridges, Issue 3, above n 61.
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consultations, which were conducted until early Sunday afternoon.74 Many
observers, however, wondered why Derbez prioritized the Singapore issues
over agriculture when many Member countries, both developed and
developing, had insisted that progress in the Singapore issues should be
linked to developments in agriculture negotiation.75
After intense last-ditch consultations with a larger group of countries,
Derbez suspended the consultations for a one-hour recess to allow these
countries to speak with their regional or other groupings. 76 Up to this very
moment, there was still a ray of hope. During these consultations, signs of
flexibility began to show. For instance, the EU was reportedly prepared to
drop controversial investment and competition issues out of the Doha
Agenda.77
Yet, when Member countries returned after the recess to the green room,
the concessive atmosphere suddenly evaporated, and positions stiffened once
more.78 Botswana declared on behalf of the African Union that they would
not accept any deal that included any of the Singapore issues.79 In stark
contrast, Japan and Korea insisted that all four Singapore issues should be
included in any kind of deal.80 Facing a stalemate, Derbez, in yet another
unexpected move, closed the entire Conference by concluding that he did not
see any possibility of deal-making within the time remaining.81 Once again,
many observers were puzzled by Derbez’s decision. China and the EU
actually attempted to stop this decision by arguing that there might still be a
chance to save the conference.82 Patricia Hewitt, the United Kingdom
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, later criticized the decision as
‘premature’.
Shortly after his decision to close the conference, Derbez proposed a one-
page, six-paragraph Ministerial Statement, which was adopted in the closing
session at around 6 pm on Sunday.83 This statement essentially sent the
negotiations back to Geneva where a General Council meeting would meet no
74 WTO, Summary of 14 September, 2003, Day 5, Conference ends without consensus, http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_14sept_e.htm [hereinafter WTO Day 5];
Bridges Daily Update on the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, Issue 6, ‘Cancun Collapse: Where
There is No Will There is No Way’, 15 September 2003, http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/
wto_daily/ben030915.htm [hereinafter Bridges, Issue 6].
75 Bridges, Issue 6, above n 74.
76 WTO Day 5, above n 74; Bridges, Issue 6, above n 74.
77 Bridges, Issue 6, above n 74.
78 WTO Day 5, above n 74; Bridges, Issue 6, above n 74.
79 Bridges, Issue 6, above n 74.
80 Id.
81 WTO Day 5, above n 74; Bridges, Issue 6, above n 74.
82 Bridges, Issue 6, above n 74.
83 WTO Day 5, above n 74; Bridges, Issue 6, above n 74.
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later than 15 December 2003.84 The only silver lining was the acceptance of
Cambodia and Nepal as new Members.85 The Fifth Ministerial Conference
in Cancún officially failed, making it the second major setback, along with the
Seattle debacle, since the encouraging launch of the WTO.
C. Coda
The demise of the Cancún Conference was soon followed by an inundation of
announcements and press releases by different governments and institutions.
Markedly, a North–South line was also salient in this blame game: Developed
and developing countries pointed their fingers at each other. The US mostly
found fault with developing countries’ intransigent stance and lack of their
own concessions, particularly in the area of market opening in the agricultural
sector. The USTR Robert Zoellick impliedly stated that the ‘rhetoric’ of
‘won’t do’ employed by developing countries led to the impasse.86 US
Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman of the Finance Committee, released a
similar announcement that ‘some participants seemed to be more satisfied
with hollow rhetoric than real negotiation’.87 The EU was more low-key.
Instead of criticizing developing countries, the EU Trade Commissioner,
Pascal Lamy, ascribed the collapse to the ‘medieval’ decision-making process
in the WTO.88
On the contrary, developing countries – as well as most NGOs – criticized
rich countries’ lack of willingness to open their markets to poor countries.
African countries expressed their disappointment concerning a lack of
consideration from developed countries on agriculture and other develop-
ment issues.89 The G-21 refuted the notion that their inflexibility sunk the
conference but expressed their collective satisfaction with the unity that they
showed in the conference.90 NGOs voiced in unison their strong criticism
against the inertia by rich countries, in particular the US and the EU, in their
stances on agriculture and other development-related issues. Greenpeace
84 Ministerial Statement, Ministerial Conference, The Fifth Session, adopted on 14 September 2003,
WT/MIN(03)/20, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_20_e.doc [herein-
after The Cancún Statement].
85 Id.
86 USTR, Press Release, ‘Statement of U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick’, 14 September
2003.
87 The Office of the US Senator Chuck Grassley, Memorandum: Collapse of Trade Negotiations in
Cancún, 14 September 2003 [hereinafter Grassley Memorandum].
88 Bridges, Issue 6, above n 74.
89 Id.
90 Id. One anonymous commentator on an earlier version of this article observed that: ‘G-21 served a
useful purpose at Cancún because it avoided the acceptance of a bad deal in agriculture. It is too
early in the negotiations for the developing world to accept the US–EC proposal, which is very
limited’.
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declared ‘USA and EU sink the WTO Round in Cancún’.91 Oxfam also
observed that the US and the EU ‘wrecked’ WTO trade talks.92 Likewise, the
Public Citizen noted that the conference collapsed when the US and the EU
‘stubbornly rejected the demands of the majority of the organization’s
signatory nations to make the global trade rules more fair’.93
In hindsight, one might bring to mind a host of factors that are cumulatively
accountable for the fall of the Cancún Ministerial Conference.94 First, a
general lack of preparation: Since the Doha Conference, Member countries
had been unable to narrow down the gap in their diverging, often in a
diametrical fashion, stances in the core Doha agenda items, such as farm
subsidies and the Singapore issues. In fact, Member countries should have
come to Cancún with a solid negotiational text containing a reasonable
amount of brackets to complete the Doha Round as scheduled by the end of
2004.95 Yet, Member countries convened without a realistic text that could
have established a deal during the five-day period of negotiations.
In fact, the first factor is associated with the second one: The core Doha
agenda items, including agricultural issues and the Singapore issues, were all
politically sensitive. To politicians of developed countries, the elimination of
long-standing farm subsidies might mean the overnight loss of the local
farmer support, which could cost them their next elections. To governments
of developing countries, accepting the Singapore issues might mean placing a
Trojan horse in their own backyard. Developing countries fear that developed
countries legitimize the latter’s new trade barriers in the name of investment
and competition, eventually restricting the import of agricultural products
and textiles from the former, thereby blocking the realization of the former’s
comparative advantage.
Thirdly, developed countries, in particular the US, may have felt deprived
of sufficient political capital to enable them to accept demands from
developing countries after they had already made the important concession
of allowing certain developing countries to import generic medicine.96
Indeed, US Senator Grassley highlighted this very fact in Cancún and
criticized the lack of reciprocal flexibility from developing countries.97
91 Greenpeace, News Release, ‘USA and EU Sink the WTO Round and We Call on Governments to
Create a New Trade System’, 14 Sepember 2003.
92 Oxfam, Press Release, ‘Rich Countries Wreck WTO Trade Talks’, 14 September 2003.
93 Public Citizen, Statement of Lori Wallach, Director of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, 14
September 2003.
94 See notably Gary Clyde Hufbauer, ‘The WTO: Are Past Glories a Prologue to Future Failures?’,
Eldon D. Foote Lecture 2003, University of Alberta, 30 October 2003 [hereinafter Hufbauer, Foote
Lecture].
95 See Guy de Jonquires and Frances Williams, ‘WTO Ministers Racing to Make Up Lost Time’,
Financial Times (8 September 2003), www.ft.com.
96 See above text accompanying n 37.
97 Grassley Memorandum, above n 87.
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Last but not least, the ‘China factor’ enabled the creation of the G-21. Even
before China entered into the WTO, Brazil and India, as ‘super’ developing
countries, often acted as the voice for other developing countries. But with
China in their ranks, the size and impact of this coalition became
unprecedented. Although political balance sheets of individual participants
of the G-21 were not necessarily homogenous, its symbolic unity that was
developed and maintained in Cancún was powerful enough to defy developed
countries’ pressure.
iii. Quo Vadis WTO?: POST-CANCÚN PROSPECTS
A. North versus South: revisited
The North–South tension witnessed in Cancún is not new, as demonstrated
by the Seattle debacle. Yet, in Cancún it was revealed in a more dramatic
fashion for reasons mainly attributable to the South. First, major developing
countries, including India, Brazil, and China, succeeded in orchestrating their
efforts into a common stance against developed countries on major
negotiation topics such as agriculture even before the Cancún Conference
began. When the US and the EU announced their joint position on farm
subsidies in August 2003, these developing countries immediately denounced
the position and issued their own version of the negotiation text.98 In
addition, as mentioned above, the ‘China factor’ certainly invigorated this
movement. According to one commentator, the G-21 countries ‘have at least
shamed the rich world into silence’.99
Another significant development in Cancún in relation to North versus
South was a rally of most NGOs behind developing countries. As seen in
numerous announcements released in reaction to the fall of the Cancún
Conference, most high-profile NGOs, such as Greenpeace, Oxfam, and
Public Citizen, explicitly backed the developing countries’ stand and heavily
criticized developed countries, in particular the US and the EU, for a lack of
consideration for their poorer trading partners.100 This NGO patronage for
developing countries and the LDCs may invite two interesting consequences.
First, as NGOs become more attached to developing countries and their
agendas, developing countries may retain more leverage against developed
countries in future negotiations. On the other hand, considering that
developing countries account for three-fourths of the whole WTO member-
ship, these NGOs’ backing of developing countries tends to engage the NGOs
more deeply in WTO business. These engagement dynamics are likely to lay a
98 Developing Countries Present Farm-Trade Plan, UN Wire, 21 August 2003, http://www.unwire.org/
UNWire/20030821/449_7715.asp.
99 Jonathan Eyal, ‘G21 – A Flimsy Alliance Doomed to Fail’, The Straits Times (27 September 2003).
100 See above text accompanying nn 91–93.
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fertile ground for better understanding and communication between NGOs
and the WTO, although such understanding and communication does not
necessarily mean that they will endorse the legitimacy of the WTO in general.
Second, NGOs have their own domestic constituencies, as evidenced in the
performance of Ralph Nader and his Green Party in the 2000 US presidential
election. This means that their continuous campaigning in the domestic arena
for developing countries’ interest, such as the elimination of farm subsidies,
may have some influence in reshaping local politics and, subsequently, trade
policies. The current ‘left-leaning’ political climate in Europe also tends to
support this observation.101 In sum, NGOs that espouse and represent
developing countries may neutralize local protectionism to a certain extent.
In prospect, it is likely that the North–South tension will continue for the
time being as long as the Doha Development Agenda is left unresolved.
However, one should not accept a fanciful notion that developing countries
will always voice a unified position. The well-orchestrated stance of the G-21
in Cancún was in fact pre-deliberated and mainly for the sake of the Cancún
Conference.102 One could not confidently predict that their stance will
remain as solid in the future as it was in Cancún. Interests of G-21 members
are not homogenous. For instance, while India still wants to protect domestic
agricultural industries, Brazil, a member of the Cairns Group consisting of
agricultural product exporters, wants to further liberalize trade in this area.103
Moreover, we witnessed other groups of developing countries, such as the G-
33, which advocated the inclusion of strategic products and a special
safeguard mechanism in the agriculture negotiation; the coalition of the
African Union, the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries, and the LDCs
(AU/ACP/LDCs) which collectively want the preservation of current
preferential treatment in addition to G-33 demands.104 Obviously, future
dynamics among these groups will play a decisive role in the upcoming
negotiation.105
At the same time, the inevitable North–South tension should not serve to
endorse the maintenance of trade barriers by developing countries them-
selves. As Jagdish Bhagwati trenchantly observes, many developing countries
are still imposing high tariffs and other protectionist measures against both
101 See Tobias Buck, ‘Cancun Summit: Lamy Returns Home to Face Anger and Disappointment’,
Financial Times (16 September 2003), www.ft.com.
102 See Guy de Jonquières and Frances Williams, ‘Third World Alliance Hits at Trade Rules’, Financial
Times (10 September 2003), www.ft.com.
103 Eyal, above n 99.
104 Bridges Daily Update on the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, Issue 4, New Ministerial Text to Be
Issued Today, 13 September 2003, http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/wto_daily/
ben030913.htm [hereinafter Bridges, Issue 4].
105 Id.
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developed and developing countries.106 In particular, protectionism among
developing countries not only is pernicious to their economic welfare but also
tends to provide developed countries with a subterfuge for maintaining their
own protection against developing countries.
B. Bilateralism, regionalism, and unilateralism
As multilateralism loses steam with the setback in Cancún, alternative
avenues of trade negotiations, such as bilateral and regional trade agreements,
seem to be spotlighted. The prospect of these types of agreements appears
even more likely considering an ongoing series of bilateral trade agreements
that the US has recently completed or worked on with many trading partners.
The US has already sealed a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) deal with
Jordan (24 October 2000), Singapore (6 May 2003), Chile (6 June 2003),
and Australia (8 February 2004), and is negotiating similar deals with
Morocco, Central American countries, and the Southern African Customs
Union (SACU) members.107 The US is also pushing forward the ambitious
Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA).108 As US Senator Grassley
announced, the US has a lot of ‘options’ including bilateral and plurilateral
fronts in trade negotiations.109
Not surprisingly, this non-multilateral approach tends to better serve the
interest of most US politicians and high-ranking civil servants. Considering
their short life-cycle defined by elections, this approach may be more efficient
than a multilateral one in ‘making their mark in the shortest possible time’,
thus aiding their chances of re-election.110 Moreover, this approach tends to
put a hegemon like the US in a position to wring a better deal from its weaker
counterparts in the FTAs.111 At the same time, in smaller deals on FTAs, it is
much easier to accommodate protectionist demands from local industries
than in multilateral deals.112 Yet, it would be dispiriting to witness such an
106 Jagdish Bhagwati, Wanted: Jubilee 2010 (Dismantling Protection), 26 June 2002, http://www.oec-
dobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/713/Wanted:_Jubilee_2010.html [hereinafter Bhagwati, Jubi-
lee 2010].
107 USTR, USTR Resources, Free Trade Agreement Negotiations, www.ustr.gov/new/fta
108 USTR, World Regions, Western Hemisphere: Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA),
www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/ftaa.shtml
109 Grassley Statement, above n 87.
110 Raymond Vernon et al., Iron Triangles and Revolving Doors: Cases in US Foreign Economic
Policymaking (New York: Praeger, 1991) 15.
111 See Jagdish Bhagwati, A Stream of Windows: Unsettling Reflections on Trade, Immigration and
Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998) 309 (attacking the US ‘FTA-cum-301 selfish
hegemon strategy’ as totally unfair).
112 See Edward Alden, ‘Cancun Summit: Protectionist Pressure Building Up’, Financial Times (16
September 2003), www.ft.com [hereinafter ‘Protectionist Pressure Building Up’].
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important and powerful country as the US abandoning the multilateral forum
that it invested so much in to create.113
Although some American scholars view that the move to bilateralism and
regionalism will eventually benefit multilateralism,114 one cannot deny that
FTAs are inherently preferential and discriminatory vis-à-vis non-members,
which renders this alternative problematic. Admittedly, regionalism may
contribute to multilateralism under certain circumstances through a
‘laboratory effect’.115 After experiencing trial and error as well as learning-
by-doing in the regional level, countries may feel confident in ratcheting these
regional initiatives up to the multilateral forum.116 However, the Guild nature
of FTAs tends to materialize mercantilist outcomes among their members at
the expense of non-members.117
For example, FTAs’ complicated rules of origin, which are often compared
to a ‘spaghetti bowl’,118 create an obstacle for non-members seeking to get an
access to FTA members’ markets, thereby protecting and insulating FTA
members from global competition. Similarly, the use of anti-dumping and
countervailing measures at the regional level may also shelter regional
industries from the global market.119 Furthermore, FTAs tend to avoid hard
113 See Daniel W. Drezner, ‘On the Balance between International Law and Democratic Sovereignty’,
2 Chi. J. Int’l L. (2001) 321, 329. Though Kindleberger once maintained that the US supported the
multilateral trading system as established in the GATT 1947 after the Second World War as a
‘public good’, the US has now been in the ‘diminished giant syndrome’ where it is eager to take care
of its own interest. See Jagdish Bhagwati and Douglas A. Irwin, ‘The Return of the Reciprocitarians:
US Trade Policy Today’, 10 World Econ. (1987) 109. See also Anne O. Krueger, American Trade
Policy: A Tragedy in the Making (1995) 7 (observing that the current US shift to bilateralism is an
outcome of gradual erosion of the commitment to multilateralism).
114 See e.g., Rudiger W. Dornbusch, ‘Policy Options for Freer Trade: The Case for Bilateralism’, in
Robert Z. Lawrence and Charles L. Schultze (eds), An American Trade Strategy: Options for the 1990s
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990) 106–141 (arguing that a trade bloc could render a
fresh boost to freer trade); Fred Bergsten, ‘A Competitive Approach to Free Trade’, Financial Times
(5 December 2002), at 13 (making a case of ‘competitive liberalization’). However, in the area of
regulatory cooperation and harmonization regionalism may play a constructive and complementary
role vis-à-vis multilateralism. See Sungjoon Cho, ‘Breaking the Barrier between Regionalism and
Multilateralism: A New Perspective on Trade Regionalism’, 42 Harv. Int’l L. J. (2001) 419, 429–
36.
115 C. Fred Bergsten, ‘Open Regionalism’, 20 World Econ. (1997) 545, 548.
116 John H. Jackson, ‘Regional Trade Blocs and the GATT’, 16 World Econ. (1993) 121, 130; Harold
Hongju Koh, ‘The Legal Markets of International Trade: A Perspective on the Proposed United
States – Canada Free Trade Agreement’, 12 Yale J. Int’l L. (1987) 193, 248. But see Michael P.
Malloy, ‘Bumper Cars: Themes of Convergence in International Regulation’, 60 Fordham L. Rev.
(1992) s 1, s 21–22 (describing a potential danger of regulatory clash between different jurisdictions
using a ‘bumper car’ model).
117 See Stephen Woolcock, ‘Regional Integration and the Multilateral Trading System’, in Till Geiger
and Dennis Kennedy (eds), Regional Trade Blocs, Multilateralism, and the GATT: Complementary
Paths to Free Trade (London: Pinter, 1996) 116; David Henderson, ‘The EC, the US and Others in
a Changing World Economy’, 16 World Econ. (1993) 537, 538.
118 Bhagwati, above n 111, at 290.
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issues such as agriculture and anti-dumping. This tendency has been
reconfirmed in the recent FTAA debates between Brazil and the US. The
US is reluctant to include agriculture and anti-dumping, which are politically
combustible issues, in the FTAA talk and wants them to be addressed under
the Doha Round, while Brazil prioritizes them as the core agendas of the
FTAA.120
Bilateral deals also may result in a negative effect even among non-US
partners. The US, as a ‘hub’, enjoys free access to these ‘spokes’ and holds a
superior position even in its domestic market due to economies of scale.
However, these spokes cannot collectively share benefits of improved market
access from each bilateral deal unless they form a ‘rim’ among themselves by
signing similar deals with one another.121
Nonetheless, the sum of all fears would be the surfacing of ‘unilateralism’.
The inherent discriminatory nature of bilateralism/regionalism is often
blended with an internal power disparity and ultimately begets unilateralism.
Unilateralism, which is often clad with extraterritoriality, tends to eclipse
international trade law, thereby placing the global trading system at the mercy
of bare politics by a handful of powerful states. This would be an anathema to
the WTO’s telos – ‘an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading
system’.122
C. Is a deal still possible?
Although the Cancún Ministerial Declaration mandated a General Council
meeting at the senior officials’ level no later than 15 December 2003,123 very
few people would believe that the negotiation will be sealed until the original
deadline, 1 January 2005, which itself is very close at hand.124 To make things
worse, 2004 is rife with important elections in major countries, including the
US presidential election. In the face of these elections, it would be very
difficult to expect politicians to speak out for the cause of international trade
at the risk of sacrificing local constituencies. In fact, local protectionism seems
to have already sprung up as a reaction to the fall of the Cancún
Conference.125
If Member countries are willing to extend the original deadline however,
which they will probably do, a deal is not out of the question. Some
120 See ‘Trade in the Americas: Much Wind and Little Light’, The Economist (18 October 2003), at 35–
36.
121 See Frank J. Garcia, ‘NAFTA and the Creation of the FTAA: A Critique of Piecemeal Accession’,
35 Va. J. Int’l L. (1995) 539, 558.
122 WTO Agreement, above n 3, preamble.
123 The Cancún Statement, above n 84.
124 Bridges, Issue 6, above n 74.
125 See ‘Protectionist Pressure Building Up’, above n 112; Edward Alden et al.’, Recriminations Fly
after Failure of WTO Talks’, Financial Times (15 September 2003), www.ft.com.
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explanation supports this cautious optimism. First, micro-level developments
in Cancún, in particular during the final two days, exhibited the softening of
some Member countries’ positions. For example, the EU was reportedly
prepared to drop investment and competition out of the Doha Round at the
last moment.126 It should also be remembered that individual positions within
each representative coalition are not homogeneous, which tends to make their
future coalitions porous and leaves room for shifting positions. As mentioned
above, an internal conflict of interest may exist within the G-21, especially
between India and Brazil. Furthermore, developing countries may not stand
as one group considering different inner voices from G-21, such as G-33 and
AU/ACP/LDCs. Even the EU member states were not united internally on
the Singapore issues, in particular over when and how to launch them.127
Third, despite protectionist sentiment due to major domestic elections, a
couple of political forces may counteract such sentiments. Many influential
international organizations (IOs), such as the IMF and the World Bank, as
well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), expressed their strong
support for developing countries’ demands in Cancún. Their continuing
support is likely to have a ripple effect even in the domestic political realm.
Also, the business community is eager to boost languishing economies by
launching a new round. They will certainly lobby their governments to do
something to revive the momentum of negotiations.128 These factors have led
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) ministers to voice their
support for the restart of the Doha round talks, urging WTO Members to
show ‘flexibility and political will’ to achieve an ‘ambitious and balanced
outcome’.129 Last, but not least, under most circumstances politicians prefer
to declare ‘success’ than ‘failure’, even if the final package is not fully
satisfactory.130
While these factors create a positive atmosphere for a future trade deal in
the Doha Round, other efforts should also be added to facilitate actual
negotiations. First, the role of the WTO Secretariat is critical. As discussed
above, at the micro-level there are possibilities of progress in the negotiations
through further consultation, clarification, and concession against the
backdrop of the Cancún coalitions, most of which are still fluid in nature.
In fact, a host of good suggestions on both the modalities and substance of the
negotiations were spelled out in Cancún. At this juncture, the critical mission
126 Bridges, Issue 6, above n 74.
127 Bridges, Issue 4, above n 104.
128 International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Businesses Large and Small Launch Campaign to
Push for Renewed WTO Talks, http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news_archives/2003/stories/cham-
bers_wto.asp.
129 Joint Statement, 15th APEC Ministerial Meeting, Bangkok, 18 October 2003, http://www.apecse-
c.org.sg/content/apec/ministerial_statements/annual_ministerial/2003_15th_apec_ministerial.html.
130 See Hufbauer, Foote Lecture, above n 94.
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of the WTO Secretariat is to scrutinize these possibilities and suggestions, and
furnish a rich set of workable alternatives that comprises various matrices of
give-and-take across major topics, such as farm subsidies and the Singapore
issues. For instance, one can conceive a scenario under which developed
countries commit to phase out all export subsidies to products of particular
interests to LDCs and substantially reduce those subsidies to listed products of
particular interests to other developing countries,131 while developing
countries agree to launch the negotiations of the Singapore issues on a
selective basis, i.e., excluding investment and competition. Member countries
may use this set of scenarios, which may be labeled the ‘Supachai text’, as a
basis of future negotiations. This approach may save the Doha Round just as
the ‘Dunkel text’ saved the Uruguay Round a decade ago.
Additionally, Members should devise a more effective and efficient
decision-making mechanism. With nearly 150 Members now, it becomes
harder for the WTO to deliver any important decision within a reasonable
period of time. This is not to advocate any grand, constitutional change, such
as simple majority voting, but rather to expect some sort of administrative
breakthrough. Although the current system of using ‘friends of the chair’ or
‘facilitators’ tends to overcome, to some extent, the titular ‘green room’
predicament, the WTO needs to adopt an institutional change. As Director-
General Supachai once proposed by referring to the Development Committee
and the Interim Committee (now the International Monetary and Financial
Committee) in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund,132
some sort of ‘intermediate committee’ that aims to smooth the progress of
intergovernmental consensus-making might be an option to achieve such
institutional reform.
conclusion: toward another constitutional moment
While it is true that globalization and trade expansion have benefited many
people in the world, poverty still lingers in many corners of the globe, and, in
many cases, is becoming worse.133 A strong consensus is beginning to emerge
that the global community can no longer sustain the current level of poverty
131 From a similar perspective, Jeffrey Schott argues that the US should play a leading role in ‘re-
engaging the agricultural negotiations’ with a view to agreements on substantial reduction of
domestic and export farm subsidies and special measures to help least-developed cotton-exporting
countries. Jeffrey Schott, ‘Unlocking the Benefits of World Trade’, The Economist (1 November
2003), at 67.
132 See Supachai, above n 19, at 437.
133 See United Nation Millennium Declaration, A/res/55/2, para 5, 18 September 2000, http://
www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf (‘For while globalization offers great opportu-
nities, at present its benefits are very unevenly shared, while its costs are unevenly distributed’.).
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and economic inequality.134 It seems simply unacceptable that rich countries’
annual sum of agricultural subsidies has become ‘enough to fly 41 million
dairy cows first class around the world one and a half times’,135 while
countless farmers in poor countries suffer from a continued suppression in
their produce’s price due to these subsidies.136 Poverty is no longer a mere
issue of economic policy: It is a ‘matter of life and death’137 to many people
now inhabiting the earth.138 In this regard, the fall of the Fifth WTO
Ministerial Conference in Cancún seemed to have made at least one
contribution: It spotlighted the development crisis that the global community
is now suffering.
As Amartya Sen eloquently observes, this unsustainable economic inequal-
ity will become less tolerable as the global trading community becomes more
integrated and interdependent.139 Beyond the rhetoric of unfairness and
injustice, this ‘global apartheid’140 is a clear and present danger, here and
now. ‘Poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere’.141
That is, underdevelopment and marginalization at one corner can and do lead
to asymmetrical shocks or direct physical threats to another.142 If we truly
want to live peacefully together, it is imperative that we deliver development
134 See WTO: Trade Body Protests ‘Nightmare’ Reports, UN Wire, 25 August 2000, http://
www.unwire.org/unwire/20000825/current.asp; UN Trade Conference Calls for ‘Fairer’ Economic
System, CNN.com, 18 February 2000, www.cnn.com/2000/ASIANOW/southeast/02/18/world.-
trade.02/index.html; ‘White Man’s Shame’, The Economist (24 September 1999), www.econo-
mist.com: G-77: Poor Countries Call for Fair Trade, UN Wire, 17 Apr. 2000, http://www.unwire.org/
unwire/20000417/current.asp; WTO: UN Report Charges Bias against Poorer Nations, UN Wire, 14
August 2000, http://www.unwire.org/unwire/20000814/current.asp; Little Improvement for World’s
Poor in 1990s – World Bank, UN Wire, 4 August 2000, http://www.unwire.org/unwire/20000804/
current.asp.
135 WTO, The 10 Benefits of the WTO Trading System: 4. Cost of Living, http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b04_e.htm.
136 See John Kanjagaile, ‘Cancun Should Cultivate Fairness’, 10 September 2003, Financial Times,
www.ft.com.
137 See WTO, Press Release, Speech by the Director-General Mike Moore, National Conference on
the Millennium Round (Rome, 11 November 1999), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/
spmm14_e.htm.
138 See e.g., Charlotte Denny, ‘US Blocks Brown-led Drive for Increase in Aid’, Guardian Unlimited, 23
Jan. 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,3604,637808,00.html (reporting that 2.8
billion people on earth live on less than $2 a day).
139 Amartya Sen, ‘Global Doubts’, Harv. Mag. 68 (September–October 2000).
140 See Joel Trachtman, ‘Legal Aspects of a Poverty Agenda at the WTO: Trade Law and ‘Global
Apartheid,’ 6 JIEL (2003) 3–21.
141 The Constitution of the International Labor Organization, Annex (Declaration Concerning the
Aims and Purposes of the International Labor Organization), para I (c), http://www.ilo.org/public/
english/about/iloconst.htm#annex.
142 See Poverty: U.K. Chancellor Calls for New Marshall Plan for the Developing States, UN Wire, 18
December 2001, http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20011218/22676_story.asp (quoting Gordon
Brown, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, who linked ‘poverty in the developing world’ to ‘direct
physical threats to people in industrialized countries’).
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to every corner of the world. This is best accomplished through trade, with its
uniquely demonstrated ability to promote welfare and prevent warfare.
However, to fulfill this development goal under the global trading system
the WTO need not, and should not, be converted into a ‘donor’s
conference’.143 Truly, the WTO is traditionally a venue for trade negotiations,
which inevitably involves quid pro quo and sometimes tit-for-tat. Nevertheless,
this reciprocity should be put in perspective considering current dire
situations in some corners of the globe where benefits of globalization and
free trade have been bestowed disproportionately vis-à-vis other regions. To
avoid the marginalization of these least-developed countries and help them
integrate their economies into the global stream, more liberal market access
must be granted in the areas where these countries hold comparative
advantage, such as agriculture and textiles.
The bottom line is that being a trading partner is remarkably superior in
aiding their development than being a mere donee. Such enhanced market
access should come from both developed and developing, in particular
‘middle-income’ developing, countries. At this juncture, developing countries
should realize that protection in any form, including non-reciprocal,
preferential treatment, has only a limited, temporary effect for their
development. Yet, at the same time developed countries should also realize
that not every country could and should propose the same magnitude of trade
liberalization as the developed countries themselves might and should do.144
In conclusion, we do not need nor want a deus ex machina of World
Government to overcome the current development crisis. The solution is
clear. All agree that we have to return to the basic tenet of trade liberalization:
lowering and eventually eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers as well as
repealing market-distorting practices such as subsidies. We also agree that the
capacity of some of our esteemed trading partners should be firmly built
through the redistributive mechanism of financial and technical assistance
from better-off trading partners so that the former can truly integrate
themselves to the global enterprise of trade. What is lacking is bold
‘leadership’ on domestic fronts that can transcend local parochialism and
redefine a national interest by taking into account other nations’ interest,145
143 I thank an anonymous commentator on an earlier draft of this article for raising this important issue.
144 See Edward Alden, ‘US Farmers Issue Cancun Warning’, Financial Times (8 September 2003),
www.ft.com. Alden reported that: ‘US negotiators are fighting to enshrine the concept of
‘harmonization’, which would require countries with higher tariffs and greater subsidies to eliminate
those barriers much more rapidly than countries with fewer distortions. That would mean Europe
and Japan would cut subsidies much more than the US, while developing countries would face even
steeper tariff cuts.’
145 Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 138.
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and eventually materialize a grand vision of common prosperity, peace and
human dignity.146
The global trading system has thus far undergone two constitutional
moments: the birth of GATT 1947 and the birth of the WTO. Inspiringly,
both moments sprang up as desperate responses to daunting challenges of the
time. Although we still suffer from the aftermath of Cancún, we must
embrace another constitutional moment, successfully complete the Doha
Round, and breathe new life and meaning into our Trade Constitution and its
telos of an ‘integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system’.
146 Cf. Immanuel Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch’ (1795), in Hans Reiss (ed), H.B.
Nisbet (trans), Kant’s Political Writings, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 93,
114.
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